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The rise of the soldier-emperor stands as a central feature of the Roman 
Empire in the years from 235 to 395. During this turbulent and transformative 
era, the army often made or unmade emperors. In this learned, clearly written, 
and visually pleasing monograph, Mark Hebblewhite (henceforth MH) explores the 
fraught relationship between the emperor and the soldiers he led. 
The author divides the book into six concise thematic chapters that address 
various aspects of the emperor/army relationship. A brief introduction and a short 
conclusion frame these chapters. This thematic approach leads to some overlap and 
repetition of themes and events across the chapters. More positively, the book has 
many clear and useful images of imperial coinage that allows the reader to follow 
closely the reasoning behind MH’s main lines of argument. Moreover, as far as I 
could discern, the monograph was largely free of factual and typographical errors. 
The Introduction sets up the temporal and methodological parameters for the 
study. MH posits that his book offers a unique perspective on what he describes as 
the ‘loyalty bond between the emperor and army’ (p. 4), in the key years from 235 
to 3951. By examining the symbiotic yet ofttimes troubled nature of the relationship 
between the ruler and his army, he contends that one can glean the shifting ‘nature 
of emperorship’ at a time when the military became ‘the key interest group the 
emperor needed to appease if he wished to stay in power’ (p. 1).
1. MH’s terminus in 395 is apt, since after the death of Theodosius I in that year, 
emperors had ceased to lead the army into battle personally, a trend that would continue for 
over two centuries; on this trend, see W. Kaegi, Heraclius: Emperor of Byzantium, Cambridge 
2003, 68-9.
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Chapter 1 offers an interesting if somewhat underdeveloped look at what the 
author labels, ‘the dawn of the warrior-emperor’. In contrast to many emperors 
before 235, he proves in this chapter and throughout the book that most third 
and fourth century soldier-emperors ruled ‘not by virtue of birth, but by military 
merit’ (p. 43). He contends that ‘This trend for military competence as the key 
determiner for imperial suitability’ was linked intimately to the political and 
military crises of the third century. In response to the twofold threats of external 
invasions and crippling civil wars ignited by rival claimants to the throne, those 
in power entrusted the defence of the state to a professional army of mixed descent 
that fought its battles primarily on the Empire’s outer fringes. In a further effort to 
curb threats of usurpation and create a more effective fighting force, the senators 
and other social elites who had extensively used their military commissions to 
further their political careers, no longer needed to fulfil their military duties. In 
contrast to his imperial counter-parts in the first and second centuries, from the 
third century, an emperor seldom had the luxury to remain within the environs 
of Rome focusing on his civilian role. In this period, emperors and their armies 
fought mostly on the Empire’s periphery. ‘Rome’ therefore became increasingly 
wherever the emperor and his army were campaigning. In the turbulent third 
century, this meant the locus of Roman power flowed increasingly away from 
Rome. While these developments drew the emperor closer to his officers and 
soldiers, it distanced him from the senators, aristocrats, and other civilian 
officials in Rome and its hinterlands. As MH shows so clearly, it is only against 
this backdrop that one can appreciate how and why the army was increasingly 
able to impose its will upon the emperor.
As this, and subsequent chapters reveal, since the army could make or break his 
reign, the emperor needed to spend abundant time and money massaging the mood of 
his soldiers: happy army, happy emperor. MH sifts through the contemporary literary 
and visual evidence, which uncover that emperors like Maximinus Thrax (r. 235-238) 
sought not just to promote hyper-martial images of themselves as heroic warriors, but 
also sought to break down some of the barriers between themselves and their soldiers. 
Unlike earlier emperors like Caracalla (r. 198-217) who rhetorically advertised 
themselves as ‘fellow soldiers’, but never actually battled on the front-lines with their 
men, Maximus Thrax fought with his soldiers, therefore truly fulfilling his role of 
commilito (companion in arms). As MH cautions we should not, however, take this 
egalitarian blurring of the lines between commilito and imperator too far. While it is 
true that an emperor like Julian (r. 360-363) shared some of his soldiers’ hardships—
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despite what his late fourth-century admirer Ammianus Marcellinus claimed, he, like 
most warrior-emperors, did not fight alongside his troops during the din of battle. As 
MH clarifies, ‘while the idea of the commilito could be useful in imperial messaging, 
Roman armies did not generally expect their emperors to transcend the position of 
imperator and fully embrace the physical role of commilito’ (p. 26).
While MH recognises that the growing necessity for later Roman emperors 
to promote their military qualities had deep roots in earlier Roman history, more 
could have been said about these traditional ideologies discussed in important 
recent studies like Myles McDonnell’s Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman 
Republic2. As McDonnell points out, and we noted above, during the Middle 
and Later Republic, most eligible Roman men –including those from the refined 
upper-crust– spent part of their young adulthood fighting in Rome’s armies. 
Structural changes under the Principate, however, had seen emperors increasingly 
monopolising military glory, while at the same time ‘fewer and fewer Italian 
men performed military service’. This left many within the Roman nobility 
cultivating, what McDonnell describes as ‘a private, Hellenic type of virtus’3. So, 
perhaps instead of perceiving the rise of soldier-emperors as a ‘dawn’, we should 
understand it instead as an imperial reiteration of the more traditional martial 
virtues from the Republic, when the deeds and military successes of its citizen 
cavalry-man represented the surest path to public prestige. Dominating military 
virtus had worked for most emperors during the heady days of the Pax Romana. 
However, a combination of outside invasion, structural changes within the army, 
and the gradual shift of political power away from the city of Rome to the edges of 
the empire in the third and fourth centuries, made it much more difficult for the 
emperor to maintain his ‘monopoly’ of military glory. Certainly, no emperor could 
allow a general from the Empire’s periphery to obtain a military reputation, which 
surpassed that of his own. To do so could prove fatal to his rule, since someone 
from the officer-elite who displayed the proper military qualities to his soldiers 
could quickly become a serious challenger to the reigning emperor’s legitimacy. 
The trend towards soldier-emperors in the third century therefore makes sense 
both practically and ideologically. Indeed, Republican military-heroes like Publius 
Scipio Africanus (236 BCE-183 BCE) offered templates and models for these later 
Roman emperors to emulate4.
2. M. Mcdonnell, Roman Manliness: Virtus and the Roman Republic, oxford 2006. 
3. M. Mcdonnell, Roman Manliness, 383-89.
4. See, e.g. Eutropius, Breviarium bk 3.
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The study gathers momentum with a stimulating second chapter on the 
necessity for these warrior-emperors to advertise their military successes to 
their soldiery. The author’s deft and convincing analysis of the shifting messages 
behind the inscriptions and military imagery on imperial coinage is particularly 
instructive. Although some might question whether emperors used coins to carry 
political messages and/or that the army represented the primary target for such 
communication, the author convinced me that these changes were no accident, but 
reflective of the increased militarisation in the period and therefore evidence of the 
need for the emperor to personalise his propaganda for his armies. 
Building upon the work of recent numismatic scholars, MH illustrates that by 
the opening of the third century, themes on the reverses of imperial coinage needed 
of a civilian administrator like fairness (aequitas) and piety (pietas) were being 
replaced by more traditional martial qualities, which the army now demanded from 
‘their’ emperor. Here, MH focuses more narrowly on the coinage of emperors who 
rose to power with minimal or no military achievements under their belts. He finds 
that virtus— which can be defined as military courage or manliness—served as 
a prominent theme on the coinage of these aspiring soldier-emperors. While MH 
recognizes that virtus had non-military connotations in Latin, he argues persuasively 
that the five main virtus types on imperial currency, ‘served as a broad signifier of 
the emperor’s martial nature and willingness to undertake military duties’ (p. 36).
The army expected the emperor to wield his virtus to perform his primary 
duties of either adding territory to the Roman imperium or shielding the realm 
from foreign incursions5. According to MH this expectation helps to explain why 
the imperial coinage intimately linked the imperator’s virtus to victoria (victory). 
As in the literature of the day6, praise for an emperor’s use of his military virtus to 
achieve victoria did not necessarily correspond to actual victories on the battlefield. 
Emperors like Pupienus (r. 238), Balbinus (r. 238), Gordian I and II (r. 238), Quintillus 
(r. 270) and Florianus (r. 275-276) who had never achieved military victories over 
external enemies appeared to have felt few qualms in proclaiming their martial 
virtues on their coinage to buttress their imperial pretensions. I suspect, however, 
that there may have been less thought behind the thematic choices on the coinage 
of these short-reigning emperors than MH implies. A usurper needed to muster the 
5. See, e.g. Themistius, Letter of the Emperor Constantius 18c.
6. M. Stewart, The Soldier’s Life: Martial Virtues and Manly Romanitas in the Early 
Byzantine Empire, Leeds 2017, 68-69.
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army’s support as quickly as possible, so it seems probable that they may have just 
blindly adopted themes that the earlier emperors had employed. 
Next, MH suggests that the need for a soldier-emperor to don realistic military 
outfits offered a convenient way ‘to show his troops that he prioritised their needs over 
those of his civilian subjects’. Portrait-types with the emperor dressed in scale armour 
replaced the more ceremonial muscular cuirass on the obverse of coins during the 
second half of the third century, according to MH, because ‘it was more commonly 
used in the field’, and thus offered a direct message to his men that ‘only he possessed 
the virtus needed to defend the empire’ (p. 41). The trend in the third century to 
provide life-like physiognomies of the emperors on the coinage and the tendency of 
these soldier-emperors to wear short-cut beards, emulating the fashion of soldiers of 
the day, served as another way for the emperor to prove to his men that he was one 
of them—as MH puts it, ‘not only their imperator but also their commilito’ (p. 42). 
The rise of the Tetrarchy at the close of the third century saw an ongoing 
emphasis on military ideologies. Yet, the Tetrarchs altered aspects of their victory 
celebrations. MH links the increasing political stability found under the Tetrarchic 
college to a decline of virtus themes on the coinage in the period. Instead, their 
coinage often attributed victories not to the virtus of any one emperor, but to the 
larger unity of the Tetrarchs. 
The collapse of the Tetrarchic model, and the rise of Constantine (r. 306-337) 
led to further shifts in imperial ideology. MH attributes many of these changes 
to Constantine’s establishment of a hereditary dynasty. He details the ways 
Constantine and his successors wielded motifs bettered suited to the hereditary 
dynasties they set up. As MH describes, Constantine radically reinvented his own 
portraiture to notify the army that ‘their’ emperor had transcended the constraints 
of the Tetrarchy. Little wonder then that visual motifs returned to a focus on the 
emperor’s individual martial traits.
As MH explains, Constantine’s sons needed ‘to propagate the theme of all-
conquering imperator’ to their soldiers. This necessity combined with the sons’ 
bloody rivalries might explain why the last three quarters of the fourth century 
produced some of the most violent and martial imagery on coins in Roman history. 
on the obverse of a coin a fearsome headshot of the emperor regularly in military 
garb served as a customary design, while on the reverse, a favourite motif was the 
representation of the emperor or his soldiers armed to the hilt standing over or 
spearing recoiling barbarian captives. MH contends (p. 47) that the need for these 
evocative and violent images to purposefully focus on the person of the emperor 
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as the defender of the Roman state stemmed from the stark military climate of 
the period, which culminated with the Roman army suffering a disastrous defeat 
at the hands of the Goths at Adrianople in 378. In the face of such a calamity, 
MH concludes, ‘More than ever the emperor had to demonstrate that his military 
leadership was the only thing standing between the empire and oblivion at the 
hands of Rome’s enemies’ (pp. 47-48).
The narrow purpose of all this propaganda to massage the opinion of those 
in the army raises a question. Might these martial values have just served as empty 
tropes, ignored by most soldiers well-aware of the emperors’ need to boast? MH 
largely skirts this issue. Though he does point out that there came a point when 
these aspirational emperors needed to live up to the rhetoric on their coinage or 
risk being replaced by someone with actual victories. As he admits in the Preface 
(p. x), some scholars, will reject the notion that emperors crafted these messages 
primarily for the soldiers and that they were not meant for a far-wider civilian 
audience. Certainly, in the fourth century, we find both Christian and non-
Christian intellectuals espousing for their civilian readership the importance of 
military qualities in their visions of ideal emperors7. Might then the martial themes 
displayed on the currency offer the wider public evidence that their leader was living 
up to these militaristic codes?
The chapter closes by briefly examining the Titulature of military success. 
As MH explains, during the Republic acclamations needed to be ‘linked to actual 
military achievements’ by citizen generals. Yet in the imperial period up until 235, 
an emperor could bask in the glory of his commanders’ triumphs, without leaving 
his palace. By the third century, the emperors who received acclamations were at 
least observing, if not always fighting in the battle-victories they celebrated. So, too 
had the power to celebrate these successes shifted from the Senate to the army in 
the field. After 235, we find emperors celebrating specific military victories with 
the use of proclamations (cognomina devictarum gentium). These declarations had 
become diluted under the Tetrarchs, celebrating no specific victory, but simply being 
renewed on a yearly basis. This practice shifted once again, under Constantine and 
his heirs, as MH proclaims: ‘Each cognomen held by Constantine and his sons can 
be linked to actual campaigns (p. 58)’. 
Chapter 3 investigates rewards (praemia militiae) and payments that the 
emperor made to his soldiers. As MH explains, the army was by far the largest 
7. To take only two examples, Themistius Or. 1.5c; Synesius, De regno 14.3.
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employer in the Roman state and therefore the biggest expense for the imperial 
government. Little wonder then that contemporaries were often critical of the 
amount of money the emperor lavished upon his armed forces.
Though the army had always received special financial considerations from the 
emperor, as MH posits, from the reign of Septimius Severus (r. 193-211), ‘the army’s 
growing sense of entitlement’ saw the emperor ‘raising the stipendium to curry the 
favour of the army’ (pp. 74-5). As MH avers, some have even argued that from this 
time we should see the Roman army as a mercenary force. After 235, the soldiers 
received the annona militaris, a regular payment. Military-historians continue to 
debate how and when this change came about, but by the third century soldiers no 
longer had to pay for their ‘food, arms, armour, clothing’, and housing. on this shift, 
MH concludes: “The annona militaris most likely developed from a series of one-off 
levies under the Severans to finally become under Diocletian an institutionalized 
system designed to provide the army with in-kind payments” (p. 90). 
Scrutinising late Roman laws, MH reveals that an emperor’s relationship 
with his soldiers did not end when they left military service. They continued to 
get special exemptions, discharge bonuses, lands, goods, and tax breaks. Soldiers 
wounded early in their career, could also expect to receive the same benefits as a 
veteran who had retired after 20 years of service. The emperor’s motives for these 
expenditures were no doubt self-serving. As MH points out, discharged soldiers 
‘represented a destabilising presence within the Empire’ (p. 99).  They could turn to 
banditry or more dangerously ignite rebellion. 
Not surprisingly, those soldiers closest to the emperor reaped the greatest 
rewards. Relying upon the sparse evidence found on funerary monuments and 
in the literary sources, MH reveals that imperial units and bodyguards like the 
protectores and candidati –who were expected to give their own lives safeguarding 
the emperor– received from him distinct and costly garments that proclaimed 
to all their special status. These men could also expect extra payments and gifts 
(dona) such as torques, in most instances, made up of common base metals, but, 
according to MH, owning ‘great symbolic significance’ (p. 96). In exceptional cases, 
such as when a soldier performed a significant act of valour, we find the emperor 
granting the recipient with either torques, rings, or clasps made of gold or other 
precious metals. All these ornamental gifts, which were to be displayed for all to 
see, functioned to further bind these warrior-elites to the emperor they served and 
depended upon for their high-status.
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Although these payments and rewards were far from full-proof, they offered an 
effective way for the emperor to prove to ‘his’ army that he cared for their needs. But 
the relationship was inherently unstable. As MH concludes, no amount of money or 
prize an emperor granted his soldiers could guarantee against betrayal. If the army 
refused to accept the emperor’s donativum it indeed served as ‘a public statement 
of rebellion’ (p. 83). Nevertheless, as the third and fourth centuries progressed, 
these rewards and payments gradually solidified to become an integral aspect of the 
relationship between the emperor and his army. Little wonder, then, that civilians 
might question such lavish spending when the military effectiveness of the Roman 
army came into question in the later part of the fourth century.
Chapter 4, ‘The emperor, the law and disciplina militaris’, tackles the paradox 
of being a soldier in the third and fourth centuries. Granted privileges unavailable 
to most Roman citizens, soldiers could be hailed in the contemporary sources either 
as conquering heroes or disparaged as ill-disciplined louts. Coming in at a slim 
seventeen pages, not counting notes, the chapter struggles to provide the needed 
scope to tackle its wide-range of chosen topics as diverse and contested as soldiery 
privileges, conscription, barbarization, desertion, indiscipline, and the army’s 
fraught relationship with civilians in the later Empire.
This is not to claim that the chapter has nothing important to say, only that 
these topics needed further fleshing out. The chapter is at its best when discussing 
the appeal of soldiering for those from the humble classes. As MH explains, 
‘Becoming a soldier was far more significant than simply taking up a profession. 
In reality, the Roman Army was a legal class within the empire’ (p. 121). Soldiers, 
who hailed mostly from the lower classes, were treated with respect. As we have 
seen, they certainly collected better benefits and, if they did not die in battle, had a 
better retirement than most Roman civilians. As MH reveals in this chapter, third 
and fourth-century emperors took clear steps to ensure that serving in the army 
remained an attractive choice for those from the less privileged classes of Roman 
society. 
MH further contends that soldiers ‘enjoyed a legal status that surpassed what 
they would have enjoyed as civilians’ (p. 120). For example, they could petition 
the emperor for tax relief and sometimes obtain exemptions from a range of civic 
duties. They also received the same exemption from torture enjoyed by the Roman 
aristocracy. We also have many cases of an emperor intervening to protect the 
legal-rights and wills of soldiers unable to defend themselves since they were on 
campaign or had been killed in battle. From 197, the emperor also granted them 
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the right to marry. As MH explains, for soldiers this benefit was a double-edged 
sword: “once this right (marriage) was granted, no emperor moved to take it away. 
Instead, emperors now sought to capitalize on the family structure of the army by 
ensuring that the children of soldiers would follow in their fathers’ footsteps and 
become soldiers” (p. 125).
These benefits serve as another useful reminder that military service supplied 
members of the lower-classes and non-Romans some upward mobility8.
The next section deals with the fourth-century barbarization of the army. 
Here, MH moves into disputed territory. He is certainly right to claim that with 
the increased use of non-Roman soldiers in the fourth century, the emperor’s 
relationship with his armies grew even more complex. However, on the vexed issue 
of barbarization, to my mind, MH leans far too heavily on traditional scholarship 
that underplays the role of non-Romans in the army before the fourth century, 
and tends to rely on a strict binarism between Romans and non-Romans that 
appears out of touch with the more complicated realities of the day9. The tide of 
non-Roman soldiers who flooded into the field armies in the aftermath of the defeat 
of Adrianople certainly changed the makeup of the Roman army for a time, yet 
Rome had a long history of integrating barbarians into the Empire. As Kaldellis 
has suggested, it normally only took two generations for a ‘barbarian’ to become 
‘Roman’10. So, while some modern historians highlight the general Stilicho’s (c.359-
408) half vandal parentage, they generally fail to note that the emperor Arcadius’s 
wife and mother of the emperor Theodosius II (r. 408-455), the empress Aelia 
Eudoxia (c. 378-404), was the daughter of the Frankish Western magister militum 
Bauto and a Roman mother, and therefore as much a barbarian and/or a Roman as 
the infamous generalissimo.
Next, MH turns to the controversial issue concerning the military effectiveness 
of the late Roman armies, and, in particular, the question of whether Roman 
emperors ‘deliberately relaxed standards of disciplina militaris with the hopes of 
8. Stewart, Soldier’s Life [as in n. 6], 59.
9. For a closer look at the blurring of social and political boundaries between these 
Roman and non-Roman soldiers in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries, see W. goffart, 
Barbarian Tides: The Migration Age and the Later Roman Empire, Philadelphia 2006; M. 
KuliKowSKi, Rome’s Gothic Wars, Cambridge 2006; D. Parnell, Justinian’s Men: Careers 
and Relationships of Byzantine Army Officers. 518-610, London 2017.
10. A. KaldelliS, Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformation of Greek Identity and 
the Reception of the Classical Tradition, Cambridge, 2007, 77.
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gaining political favour from the troops’ (p. 128). Here, MH does a better job of 
recognizing that the rhetorical aims of the ancient author could be out of touch with 
fourth-century realities. Late Roman writers constantly bemoaned what they saw as 
the declining disciplina militaris (disciplined fighting ability). As MH recognizes, 
however, such gloomy views can be found in Republican and imperial writers.  In 
fact, the Romans’ adulation of the role of their army in setting up the Roman realm, 
guaranteed that the contemporary army would often pale in comparison. Prone to 
pessimism, Roman literature had a long history of presenting the ‘current’ Roman 
army in a state of crisis. In rebuking contemporary soldiers and the Roman army, 
fourth-century intellectuals like Ammianus and vegetius followed an extensive 
line of Roman historians who reminisced about the good old days11. MH also 
recognises that many fourth-century emperors like Julian, valentinian I (r. 363-
375), and Theodosius I (r. 378-395) had obtained reputations for ‘imposing strict 
discipline’ upon their soldiers (p. 132). MH indeed concludes that the emperors had 
not significantly relaxed the discipline of their armies, and that when properly led, 
the army continued to perform well.
MH, however, sees desertion as a bigger problem in the fourth and fifth 
centuries than it was in earlier periods, though for his pessimistic assertions about 
the fifth century, he does not distinguish between the East and West Roman armies. 
He is correct when he writes that ‘military service was far less palatable for citizens 
of the later empire’, but does not clarify which citizens he is talking about or explain 
that many military scholars do not believe that this reluctance to serve had much to 
do with a waning of fighting zeal12. Moreover it must be pointed out that despite the 
influx of non-Romans into the Roman armies after 378, even then, the majority of 
soldiers remained Roman, and the percentage of Romans serving in comparison to 
non-Romans in the East Roman army, at least, would increase dramatically in the 
fifth and sixth centuries13. 
The chapter closes by briefly discussing the increasingly fraught relationship in 
the fourth century among the soldiers and the civilians they were supposed to protect. 
As MH indicates, we have numerous accounts in the contemporary literature of ‘sexual 
misconduct and drunken rampages’ (p. 135). Some of this friction occurs because we 
11. See, e.g., Polybius, Histories 31.25; Herodian 2.2.3-6.
12. P. SoutHern – K. r. dixon, The Late Roman Army, New Haven 1996, 68.
13. Full discussion in W. treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284-1081, Stanford 
1995, 14-15.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 09:15:07 |
BYZANTINA ΣΥΜΜΕΙΚΤΑ 28 (2018), 399-412
ΒΙΒΛΙΟΚΡΙΣΙΑ-BooK REvIEW 409
find in the later half of the fourth century soldiers and citizens coming into closer 
proximity. As MH avers, the emperors did not seem to support such misconduct. 
He offers abundant evidence of fourth-century emperors issuing legislation to crack 
down on such indiscipline. Nevertheless, MH asserts that the very need to legislate 
might indicate that discipline was breaking down. Yet Elton aptly reminds us, that 
our ancient sources tend to complain about a minority of soldiers’ poor behaviour, 
rather than point out many military men ‘who did their jobs’14.
The book closes with two strong chapters. In Chapter 5, ‘Rituals of Identity’, 
MH offers an erudite survey on three main aspects of the emperor’s ritualised and 
symbolic interactions with the army: acclamatio (accession ceremony), adlocutio 
(speeches to the army), sacramentum militiae (soldier’s oath). Although the ancient 
sources did not adhere to this strict terminology, MH’s categorising of these three 
main categories, offers a pathway into examining the role that these ceremonial 
interactions played in binding an emperor to his men.
The army had long played a role in imperial accession. As MH states, lacking 
‘any regularl applied legal or constitutional rules’ to establish legitimacy, new 
emperors needed the support of ‘various interest groups, particularly the army’. Up 
until 235, most emperors remained ‘content to receive their accession acclamatio 
from the troops who garrisoned Rome (p. 140)’. This meant that soldiers outside 
of Rome played little or no part in the process. The army’s role in this process 
changed from 235 as the emperor spent more time campaigning and thus sought 
the support of his provincial armies. Blessed by relative political stability and keen 
on emphasizing consensus and ceremony, to advertise military support for their 
political ideology, the Tetrarchy crafted more formulaic accession ceremonies. 
Diocletian’s act of transferring his commanders field cloak to the new Caesar 
offered a ‘visual statement of the Tetrarchic principle whereby membership of a 
college was based on military prowess’ (p. 142).
The acclamatio developed further under Constantine. It appears that the 
ceremony was driven by the first Christian Emperor’s need to magnify his own 
military prowess and legitimacy as a means of coaxing the army that he had passed 
down these virtues to his sons. Unfortunately, we know little about the accession 
process of Constantine’s sons. Luckily, as MH highlights, we have detailed evidence 
from Ammianus about Julian’s acclamatio from 360. It offers firm evidence that 
14. H. elton, off the Battlefield: The Civilian’s view of Late Roman soldiers, Expedition 
10 (1997), 42-50.
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protocols developed in the third century and refined under Constantine needed to be 
followed. As MH describes it, at Paris, Julian’s army famously held an ‘impromptu 
ceremony whereby Julian was raised on an infantryman’s shield and crowned from 
a torque taken from the neck of a draconarius’ [soldiers who bore cavalry standards 
known as the dracones]. once the ceremony was complete, ‘Julian offered the troops 
a donativum before returning to the palace’ (p. 145).
As MH underlines, this is the first known example of a coronation being 
included in the acclamatio process. He rejects, however, the common notion that the 
use of the torque and the raising on the shield represent evidence of novel Germanic 
customs entering imperial acclamatio. Instead, he considers them as ‘emergency 
measures designed to mimic official Constantinian practice’ (p. 146). Whatever the 
truth of the matter, protocols needed to be followed. MH is surely correct when he 
declares, ‘This incident shows the importance of ceremonial action in conferring 
legitimacy (p. 146)’.
Set-speeches provided the emperor the opportunity to communicate directly to 
his soldiers. While the surviving literary record provides us with some of the main 
themes of the actual speeches, the adlocutio scenes on the coins and medallions of 
the late Roman emperors, provide tangible evidence of their role to maintain their 
army’s enthusiasm, counter the words of their rivals, and remind the soldiers of 
their special bond. As MH writes: ‘While the effectiveness of adlocutio should not be 
overemphasised, it is similarly unwise to dismiss the practice as ceremonial window 
dressing’ (p. 158). 
Much the same could be said about the military oaths of fidelity. While some 
might scoff at their effectiveness in an era when many soldiers broke their oaths and 
betrayed the emperor, as MH suggests, we should not see this as a sign that they 
did not take the sacramentum seriously. Yet, it is also true that an emperor with 
actual military achievements under his belt found his soldiers to be more compliant 
to their oaths. To this point, MH concludes, that despite the symbolic importance 
of these oaths, for the sacramentum to strengthen, the emperor needed to prove his 
worthiness to the oath through military successes.
Chapter 6, ‘Symbols of Power’, deals with the reality that most soldiers rarely 
ever met the emperor in person. According to MH, this distance made these soldiers 
‘susceptible to the influence of political usurpers who enjoyed a close proximity to 
the troops stationed far away from the emperor’ (p. 180). It was therefore vital for 
an emperor to communicate via symbols to their men to keep their loyalty over long 
distances.
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Dealing with admittedly slim evidence, the chapter opens by examining how 
the emperor linked himself ideologically to individual unit’s military standards 
(signa militaria). one such example, was the dragon standard (draco) mentioned 
above, which ‘consisted of a bronze wolf or snake’s head with a piece of fabric 
attached’ (p. 181). These standards were complimented by portraits or busts of the 
reigning emperor, which, according to MH, served as a constant ‘reminder of the 
emperor’s control over the lives of even the humblest of his subjects’ (p. 184).
The signa militaria also served a practical purpose. on the battlefield they help 
to distinguish units from one another and during the fog of battle could serve as a 
rallying point for troops. As MH adds, they also functioned ‘as a visual reminder 
of a unit’s past record and a physical manifestation of their esprit de corps’ (p. 
181). Naturally, the emperor hoped to attach his own symbolic authority to what 
MH shows was the soldiers’ intense loyalty to their individual unit-symbols. MH 
argues that the adoption of Christianity did not have an immediate impact on signa 
militaria. As MH aptly warns, ‘we must be cautious of Christian writers who argue 
that the Labarum was a medium for spreading religious fervour. Under Constantine, 
the potency of the Labarum as a symbol of power lay in its ambiguity’ (p. 189). 
Since signa militaria served as a reminder of the emperor’s authority, it comes 
as no surprise that they featured regularly on imperial coinage and other visual 
propaganda. During the period 235-284, we also find an upsurge in honorific 
coinage honouring the army. Fides and Concordia represented two favourite 
concepts. MH posits that, ‘The proliferation of these messages again shows the 
willingness of the emperor to admit publicly that the military was central to his 
continuing rule’ (p. 198). 
MH closes with the lament, ‘that we must end by again noting the sober fact 
that this period is littered with emperors who ostensibly did everything “right” and 
still lost the army’s support’ (p. 218). This stark reality might make some readers 
wonder if all the actions taken by the late Roman emperors to please their soldiers 
were for naught. Why keep trying to suck up to your army if they might end up 
assassinating you anyway? It seems that a partial solution to this vexing problem 
was found in the troubled reigns of Theodosius I’s feeble non-warrior sons, Arcadius 
(r. 395-408) and Honorius (r. 395-423). We find these emperors –and those that 
followed in the fifth and sixth centuries– putting some distance between themselves 
and their armies. The Theodosian and valentinian emperors let their generals do 
the fighting while they played more ceremonial roles that promoted their civilian 
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and religious qualities15. No longer completely beholden to the whims of the army, 
the emperor could let his generals deal with the military, while he basked in the 
relative security provided by his heavily protected palaces. Though both modern 
and ancient historians have lambasted Honorius and Arcadius for destroying ‘their 
polities through their enervated lifestyles’16, it is surely significant that the non-
soldiers Honorius, Theodosius II (r. 408-450), and valentinian III (425-455) were 
some of the longest serving emperors. This is surely no coincidence. We might 
attribute some of this longevity to these emperors’ relative insulation from their 
fifth-century armies endemically riven by rival factions. one can only hope that 





15. For these non-campaigning emperors, see now M. Mcevoy, Child-emperor Rule in 
the late Roman West, AD 367-455, Cambridge, 2013. one may attribute this tendency to 
avoid combat to several other interrelated factors, including these emperors’ age when they 
obtained the purple, internal politics, and the stark lessons learned in the wake of the deaths 
of the fourth-century emperors Julian and valens in battle.
16. R. wilKinSon, Theoderic Goes to the Promised Land: Accidental Propaganda in 
Jordanes’ Gothic History?, Early Medieval Europe 26.3 (2018), 259-81.
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